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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, 
Petitioner and Appellee 
~Vo~ 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE 
Case No. 990350-CA 
Priority 15 
Appellee, Frances R. Bolliger, hereinafter "Petitioner" submits the following brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1998). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Appellant correctly marshal the evidence for this appeal? 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that there had been no substantial, 
material changes in circumstances to support a decrease in alimony? 
3. Did the trial court err in finding that the retirement of Ronald Bolliger 
(hereinafter "Respondent") was foreseeable and was this finding even material to the final 
ruling of the trial court? 
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4. Did the trial court act within its sound discretion to deny any reduction in 
alimony when the comparative incomes of the parties at the time of trial were essentially 
equal? 
5. Should Petitioner be awarded her attorneys fees and costs for the appeal, 
payable by Respondent? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court must review the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated §30-
3-5 (7)(g)(i) and the ruling on the Petition for Modification, under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters, absent manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett 836 
P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Petitioner sets forth in the attached Addendum, the complete code provisions 
referenced in this brief as follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) 
2. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, presiding. 
The parties in this action were divorced by Decree of Divorce entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court on or about March 3, 1987. That divorce was finalized by 
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Stipulation of the Parties and after a marriage of 34 years. Respondent, Ronald E. Bolliger 
file! a Petition to Modify on or about October 14, 1997 alleging there had been a 
substantial material change in circumstances since entry of the decree to reduce alimony. 
Petitioner, Frances R. Bolliger filed a Counterclaim for Modification on or about 
Nofember 12, 1997 alleging that if the Court found changed circumstances, then her 
aliipony should be increased. 
At the time of trial, the parties had filed a Stipulation of Undisputed Facts 
(Addendum "2"). Both parties in this action resided out of state and counsel agreed to 
stipulate to relevant facts and file written arguments with the Court in lieu of trial 
tesf mony. The Court provided an opportunity for hearing and argument on December 8, 
1998. At that time, the Court made a bench ruling denying the Petition of Respondent to 
dedrease alimony. Amended Findings and Amended Order of Modification were entered 
February 4, 1999 (Addendum, A-l). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner submits the following statement of facts: 
1. Petitioner, Frances R. Bolliger resides in Arizona and is age 64. 
2. The parties in the action were married approximately 34 years prior to their 
divorce; they have three adult children as issue from their marriage. 
3. Since the divorce of the parties was final March 3, 1987, the Petitioner has 
remained unmarried. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce -
Addendum - 14). The Respondent remarried in April, 1989. 
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4. The Decree of Divorce awarded to Petitioner permanent alimony in the sum 
of $685.00 per month commencing April, 1987; additionally, she was awarded one-half of 
the military retirement benefits being received by the parties. The Respondent was also 
ordered to pay Petitioner one-half of any increases he received in his military retirement 
benefits. Lastly, the Decree required Respondent to pay the premium on three policies of 
life insurance with Petitioner as beneficiary and to maintain the premium on the Air Force 
Survivor's Benefit Plan with her as beneficiary. 
5. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered at the time of the 
Decree, stated that Respondent was employed full time at Sperry Corporation and earned 
a gross annual income of approximately $45,600.00 per year. Further, that he was a 
member of the Air Force for 28 years and received an Air Force pension of approximately 
$1,428.00 per month. The Findings stated that Petitioner was employed part time at a 
restaurant earning $4.00 per hour, for a gross monthly income of approximately $340.00. 
6. The Affidavit of Frances E. Bolliger dated October 13,1998, of record in this 
matter, stated that she ceased part time employment as a waitress in 1991 due to health 
problems. At that time, she was earning approximately $500.00 a month as a waitress. Her 
Affidavit confirmed increasing health problems including arthritis in her hands and legs 
which prevented her ability to continue working as a waitress. She also has had treatment 
and surgery for ulcers; suffered a stroke in April, 1998 which affected her left side; was 
diagnosed with Bell's Palsey in 1992; suffers from high blood pressure requiring 
medication; and had surgery to remove facial bone fungus in 1998. The Affidavit included 
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a letter from her treating physician, Guy Cary, M.D., stating that Petitioner's neurological 
problems prevent her from being employed. (Addendum, A-2 8). 
7. At the time of trial in this matter, Petitioner's income consisted of the 
following: Social Security benefits in the amount of $521.00 per month; alimony from 
Respondent in the amount of $685.00 per month; Half the Respondent's Air Force 
Retirement in the amount of $ 1,184.00 per month for a total monthly income of $2,390.00. 
(Addendum A-10). 
8. At the time of trial in the matter, Respondent was retired from full time work 
and was receiving pension payments from L3 Communications of $682.00 per month; 
Sofial Security benefits in the amount of $1,071.00 per month; half of his Air Force 
Reiirement in the amount of $1,184.00 per month for a total of $2,937.00 per month. 
9. At the time of trial in the matter, after Respondent paid to Petitioner the Court 
orcjered alimony of $685.00 per month; Petitioner's total monthly income was $2,390.00 
and Respondent's income was $2,252.00; a difference of $138.00. 
10. At the time of trial, the Trial court determined as a threshold matter, that there 
hai not been any substantial change in circumstances since entry of the Decree, which were 
unforeseen by the parties and which would support any modification to the Decree. The 
Coprt found that the current difference in the parties' income which was stipulated as 
$118.00, was an insufficient difference to warrant any change to the Court Orders herein. 
(Addendum A-2). The Court noted that the alleged changes asserted by Respondent 
coisisting of his retirement and the receipt by the parties of Social Security benefits were 
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foreseeable events. Further, that the Decree of Divorce in this matter set forth the 
agreement of the parties based on a stipulation to a permanent alimony award. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence for this Appeal. The 
appellate court cannot determine whether findings are erroneous where the exercise of Trial 
court discretion was proper, unless the Appellant properly marshals evidence. This Court 
has defined the marshaling requirement as requiring the Appellant to cite "every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial" that supports the trial court's findings. West Valley 
City vs. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is also evident that 
what facts the Appellant does include are one-sided and are selected facts favorable to 
Respondent's position, rather than properly marshaled evidence. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request of 
Respondent for a reduction in alimony. The Court correctly found that there had not been 
proven a substantial material change of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce 
in this matter. It is well settled that property and alimony awards "will be upheld unless 
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App.) Cert Denied, 817 P.2d 325 (Utah 1991). 
3. The Trial court correctly found that the Respondent' s retirement from Sperry 
Corporation and the receipt by both parties of Social Security benefits was foreseeable. 
Further, even if the Court was incorrect in this finding, the result in this matter would be 
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unchanged given the Respondent's failure to persuade the Court of the threshold 
requirement that a substantial change of circumstances existed. 
4. The Petitioner should be awarded judgment for attorneys fees and costs 
arising from the appeal, payable by Respondent. Petitioner was awarded fees by the trial 
court and the record supports her need and Respondents ability to pay. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Respondent Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
This Court has stated on many occasions that a critical requirement of appellate 
ad\|ocacy is the duty of the Appellant to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial 
court's findings of fact. The Respondent in this case attacks the Trial court's findings in 
several respects. For example, Appellant states that the Decree is "void of any mention or 
reference of retirement benefits for either party... [and that] there is nothing in the Decree 
or fie record to indicate that Social Security Benefits were estimated or considered for 
either party" (Brief of Appellant, page 10). The Brief of Appellant does not even contain 
a Statement of Facts. Rather, there is a Statement of The Case which contains 11 numbered 
parftgraphs which is argumentative and selective in presenting only facts that support 
Respondent's position. There is no reference in that section to the health problems of 
Petitioner which are a significant aspect of her continuing need for alimony and inability 
to work. There is also no reference to the trial court's finding that the present incomes of 
the parties are only $ 138.00 apart and that "in prior years, the difference always favored the 
Reipondent." (Addendum, A-2) 
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In the recent case of Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the Court 
found on appeal that Mr. Moon had simply reargued his own evidence and because he 
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the Appellate Court had 
to assume that the record supported the findings of the trial court. Similarly, in this case, 
the failure to marshal the evidence must also lead to the Appellate Court herein affirming 
the findings of the trial court as complete and correct, for purposes of this appeal. 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Respondent's Petition to Reduce Alimony. 
The overall focus of Respondent's argument to decrease alimony in this case is that 
there has been a large percentage decline in Respondent's income because of his 
retirement. Nowhere in his brief does Respondent actually compare the incomes at the time 
of entry of the Decree of Divorce to the incomes at the time of the modification trial. 
Correctly, this comparison was made by the trial court and formed a specific basis for the 
trial court's finding that there was no substantial material change in circumstances to justify 
reducing alimony. This direct income comparison is also conspicuously absent from the 
statement of the case in Appellant's Brief. 
The trial court was clearly mindful of the standard in Utah courts, that for a trial 
court to reduce or terminate alimony, the Court must be "persuaded that the [recipient's 
spouse] will be able to support herself at a standard of living to which she was accustomed 
during the parties' marriage or that [the payor's spouse] is no longer able to pay." Fullmer 
v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942,951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The income comparison in the present 
case was undisputed and based on a written stipulation of relevant facts filed by the parties. 
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Thi trial court made the following specific finding on changes in circumstances: "The 
Cofirt is also not persuaded that the current difference in the parties' incomes which has 
beqn stipulated is $138.00, is a sufficient difference to warrant any change to the Court 
Orders herein." (Addendum "1"). Thus, whether the Appellant's complicated calculations 
shc|wing that Respondent's income from the time of his full time employment to the time 
retirement has been reduced 1% or 90% is beside the point. Rather, in focusing on 
thelFullmer requirement, and comparing the present incomes of the parties, the trial court 
wal correctly persuaded that there was no substantial material change in circumstances to 
justify a reduction in alimony. 
The burden of Respondent at the time of trial was to first show that there had been 
a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce to 
mefct the statutory threshold before a modification can occur. The trial court found that 
Respondent had failed to meet this burden. The only changes asserted by Respondent at 
thqitime of trial to meet this burden were first, the fact of Respondent's retirement from full 
tinie employment and second, the parties' receipt of Social Security Benefits. The Court 
found neither of these events to be unforeseeable or persuasive in establishing changed 
circumstances. Appellant also misunderstand the modification requirements by claiming 
thai the failure to find these elements were foreseeable was an error by the Court. The trial 
cofrt had not even reached the question of foreseeability if it is not persuaded that 
sutostantial changed circumstances exist. If such a substantial change can be found, the 
Cctirt would then consider whether that change was foreseeable at the time of entry of the 
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Decree of Divorce. In the present case, it is evident that the trial court did not even find a 
change of circumstances so the question of foreseeability does not even arise. 
Correctly, the trial court focused on the key issue in this alimony modification 
request which is the level of incomes of the parties. The Stipulation of Undisputed Facts 
filed in advance of trial, showed there was no dispute on the income issues. The incomes 
at the time of entry of the Divorce Decree were clearly stated in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which showed that Petitioner worked part time and earned $340.00 
gross per month, and Respondent worked full time and earned $3,800.00 gross per month. 
The Stipulation on current incomes filed by the parties showed that Petitioner was currently 
unemployed and was receiving Social Security Benefits of $521.00 per month. The 
Stipulation showed that in 1996, Respondent earned $90,040.00, in 1997, he earned 
$58,286.00 and for his first full year of retirement from pension alone, expected to earn 
$28,764.00 or $2,397.00 gross monthly. There is no question that Respondent's earnings 
have decreased significantly from the time he was employed full time, but that alone does 
not establish a change of circumstances to reduce alimony. The trial court compared the 
parties' current incomes and found that after Respondent's payment of alimony, at the level 
ordered in the Decree of $685.00 per month, that the present difference in the parties' 
incomes was only $ 13 8.00 which the Court found to be an insufficient difference to warrant 
any change in alimony. The analysis of the trial court which focused first and foremost on 
whether a change of circumstances had occurred was correct and should be affirmed. The 
Respondent's line of argument on whether retirement and receipt of Social Security 
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Benefits are foreseeable events is beside the point and only begs the question as to whether 
or not substantial changes of circumstances has been established. Since Respondent failed 
to carry his burden on proof to persuade the trial court that there was a change of 
circumstances, the foreseeability analysis is irrelevant. 
The Appellant takes many pages in his brief to assert that there has been a large 
percentage decrease in Respondent's income without ever comparing the actual income 
numbers. Certainly, percentage changes in income alone should never be allowed to 
support a change in circumstances. Considering the span of time in this case of 11 years, 
it is reasonable to expect that there would be substantial changes in incomes due to factors 
such as inflation or job changes over that period of time. The relevant analysis should 
instead, focus on the alimony factors such as comparative earning ability, the ability of a 
party to support himself/herself in the standard of living established at the time of marriage, 
and so forth. The trial court again was entirely accurate in declining to find a change of 
circumstances when the difference in the parties' monthly income was only $138.00. The 
Court also noted that "it is evident that ever since the divorce, there has been a much 
greater difference between the incomes of the parties than the present gap of $138.00, and 
that in prior years, the difference always favored the Respondent." This comment strikes 
at the heart of Respondent's argument that his client should be entitled to a larger share of 
earnings rather than simply have his earning level be equal or near that of Petitioner's. A 
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quick calculation shows that at the time of the divorce, Respondent was earning $3,800.00 
gross per month from his full time, he received half the Air Force pension of $714.00 and 
paid alimony of $685.00, leaving him with $3,829.00 each month. The Petitioner worked 
part time earning $340.00 gross, received one half the Air Force pension of $714.00, and 
received alimony of $685.00 for a total monthly earning of 57,739.00. At the time of the 
divorce, Petitioner was thus earning 45% of what Respondent was earning. 
At the present time, the current incomes as stipulated at the time of the modification 
trial, show that the Petitioner earned $2,390.00 after receipt of Social Security, Air Force 
pension and alimony and Respondent earned $2,252.00 after receipt of Air Force pension, 
Social Security and payment of alimony. Thus, the gap between the parties' income has 
closed substantially and they are essentially equal in monthly earnings with Respondent 
earning 94% of what Petitioner earns. The Court found this difference to be insignificant 
and that it did not show a substantial change of circumstance sufficient to justify a 
reduction in alimony. The entire thrust of Respondent's argument seems to be that because 
the gap between the parties' incomes has closed so dramatically, his client is entitled to 
relief. There is no authority provided in Appellant's Brief for this theory which is 
unsupportable under the policy and case law of alimony in this jurisdiction. Thus the 
Findings and Orders of the trial court to deny any change to alimony based on the failure 
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of Respondent to establish substantial material change in circumstances should be affirmed. 
III. The Petitioner Should Be Awarded Her Attorneys Fees for this Appeal. 
The trial court found that the Petition for Modification of support orders was denied 
in it entirety, that Petitioner incurred costs and fees to defend the Petition and was in need 
of financial assistance to pay those expenses. Further, that the Respondent had an ability 
to assist Petitioner with her costs and fees and after reviewing a Memorandum of Attorneys 
Fees and finding those sums to be reasonable, the trial court awarded to Petitioner a 
judgment for attorneys fees in the amount of $2,925.50. 
It is well-settled that a trial court may award costs and attorneys fees in a 
modification proceeding. UCA §30-3-3 (1998). The decision to award fees and the 
amount of such fees are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Crockett v. Crockett, 
836 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court herein considered the appropriate factors 
in awarding fees to Petitioner for the trial by reviewing evidence of her financial need, the 
ability of Respondent to pay and the reasonableness of the requested fees. The attorneys 
fees awarded at trial have not been challenged on appeal. Thus, the trial record stands 
demonstrate uncontroverted to Petitioner's financial need and Respondent's ability to pay 
and Petitioner should thus be awarded all attorneys fees and costs reasonably incurred for 
this Appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the Respondent has failed to make any attempt to marshal the 
evidence presented to the trial court and on this basis, the this Court must accept as 
adequate and complete, the trial court's Findings of Fact. Any challenges to the adequacy 
of such findings should be denied or resolved in Petitioner's favor. 
The trial court correctly applied controlling law to deny the Petition to Reduce 
Alimony based on the failure of Respondent to prove any substantial material change in 
circumstances since entry of the Decree. Although Respondent attempts to distract the 
Court from the key issues by arguing that retirement was not foreseeable and that 
Respondent has had a large percentage of reduction in income, these issues are not 
material. Rather, the trial court correctly analyzed the question of whether a change in 
circumstance had occurred by comparing the actual, real incomes of the parties and finding 
that the present discrepancy of $138.00 between their actual earnings was not sufficient to 
support a change of circumstances. Once the smoke and mirrors of Respondent's argument 
is taken away, it is apparent that he seeks a reduction in alimony based entirely on the fact 
that he believes he deserves more monthly income than the Petitioner simply because it's 
always been that way. If the Court were to apply the common, equalization of income 
approach to this long term marriage, it would only be a $69.00 monthly amount to equalize 
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incomes. Given that fraction, the Court wisely declined to make any adjustment to 
alimony. 
It is appropriate that the trial court award to Petitioner her attorneys fees and costs 
on appeal based on the court's findings that such an award was appropriate. The 
Respondent does not challenge the award of fees at the trial court level. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Findings and Order of the 
trial court and deny the appeal as there has been no abuse of discretion established herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 3-® day of September, 1999. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
7<&^?r 
Suzanne Marelius 
Attopa^y for Petitioner/Appellee 
426South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7823 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee to be mailed this Pcffi day of September, postage prepaid, to: 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
136 South Main Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT84101 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law; and Amended Order on 
Modification - Entered February 4, 1999; 
2. Stipulation of Undisputed Facts, dated October 19, 1998. 
3. Findings of Fact, Decree of Divorce, entered March 3, 1987. 
4. Affidavit of Frances R. Bolliger, October, 1998. 
5. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) 
6. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1988) 
K \WPDATA\SuZANNE\S9\Bolhger-Bnef to Utah Court of Appeals wpd 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Facsimile: (801) 575-7834 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, | AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Case No. 854903252 DA 
Respondent. S Judge Henriod 
ooOoo 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court December 8, 1998 for argument on 
the Petitions for Modification filed by the parties, before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding. Petitioner was represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius and Respondent was 
represented by counsel Michael A. Jensen. The parties had filed a Stipulation on undisputed 
facts and memoranda in support of arguments. The Court considered the file and record herein, 
argument of counsel, and being well-advised in the premises and good cause appearing does 
make the following: 
A~i 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent filed a Petition to Modify Alimony on or about October 1997 and 
Petitioner filed a Counter-Petition in November 1997. 
2. The parties in this action were married for 34 years until their divorce March 3, 
1987. That Decree ordered Mr. Bolliger to pay alimony in the amount of $685 per month; that 
the military retirement pension be divided equally; that he pay the monthly premium for the 
Armed Services Survivor Benefit Plan which was $157 per month at the time of the divorce; and 
last, that he maintain life insurance with Petitioner as the sole beneficiary in the amount of 
$86,000 from two policies then available to Respondent. 
3. The Court first considered whether there had been any substantial change since 
entry of the Decree, unforeseen by the parties to support any modification to the Decree. The 
Court finds that there has been no substantial, material change in circumstances sufficient to 
modify the Decree. The alleged changes of Respondent's retirement and the parties' receipt of 
social security benefits are foreseeable events. Further the parties agreed to a permanent 
alimony award. The Court is also not persuaded that the current difference in the parties' 
incomes which has been stipulated as $138 is a sufficient difference to warrant any change to 
the Court orders herein. It is evident that ever since the divorce there has been a much greater 
difference between the incomes of the parties than the present gap of $138, and that in prior 
years the difference always favored the Respondent. 
2 
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4. The Court has reviewed the Decree and arguments concerning payment of the Air 
Force Survivors Benefit Plan premium and finds this to be an amount Respondent is clearly 
ordered to pay in addition to the alimony. 
5. The Respondent asserts that all but $10,000 in life insurance is no longer available 
to him. The Respondent should continue to maintain, if reasonably possible, other life insurance 
required in the Decree and the Petitioner should continue to be the sole beneficiary on such 
policies. 
6. The Petitioner's Motion for Contempt concerning failure to pay temporary support 
has been considered by the Court and is denied. 
7. The Court finds that the Petition for Modification of support orders brought by 
Respondent has been denied in its entirety. Further, that Petitioner has incurred costs and 
attorney's fees to defend against this Petition and that she is in need of financial assistance for 
those expenses. Further, that the Respondent has an ability to assist Petitioner with the 
attorney's fees and costs herein. The Court has received a memorandum of attorneys fees and 
costs filed by Petitioner's counsel and finds the sums requested therein to be reasonable and 
appropriate. Considering the litigation required in this case, the complexity of the issues, the 
briefing required, the Court appearances and the outcome, the Court finds Petitioner's request 
for fees to be reasonable. Petitioner is thus awarded a judgment in the amount of $2,925.50 
representing her costs and fees incurred herein, said judgment to bear interest at the legal rate 
of 7.38% per annum until paid by Respondent. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court does now make the following: 
3 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner is entitled to an Order denying any changes to the support orders in the 
Decree of Divorce which is consistent with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
2. Petitioner is entitled to a Judgment representing her costs and attorneys fees 
arising from this matter. 
DATED this ^ day of
 m 
BY THE COURT: 
Approval As to Form: 
Michael A. Jensen 
STEPHEN HENRIOD 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this /? day of 
'.Cx , 1999, to: 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
136 S. Main #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656 
^ ^ g ^ C 
S12\bolliger.FFC 
ft-? 
SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Facsimile: (801) 575-7834 
cuED DISTRICT COURT 
?!TW?d Judicial District 
\ * 
JU^£° 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-00000-
pi^/6/3 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED ORDER ON 
MODIFICATION 
Case No. 854903252 DA 
Judge Henriod 
00O00 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court December 8, 1998 for argument on 
the Petitions for Modification filed by the parties, before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding. Petitioner was represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius and Respondent was 
represented by counsel Michael A. Jensen. The parties had filed a Stipulation on undisputed 
facts and memoranda in support of arguments. The Court having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law the Court does now make the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Respondent's Petition for Modification to support orders is denied. 
A-* 
2. The Respondent is ordered to continue all support orders stated in the Decree of 
Divorce issued March 3, 1987 in full force and effect consisting of the following: payment of 
alimony to Petitioner in the amount of $685 per month; one-half his military retirement pension 
along with any increases or adjustments made by the military; payment of the Air Force 
Survivors Benefit Plan monthly premium. 
3. The Respondent is released from the requirement to maintain any insurance 
policies which are no longer available to him. The Respondent is ordered to maintain insurance, 
if reasonably available, as otherwise required in the Decree of Divorce, naming Petitioner as the 
sole beneficiary thereon. 
4. There should be no finding of contempt for failure to pay the Court orders 
heretofore entered in this matter. 
5. The Petitioner is awarded a judgment for her costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
this matter payable by Respondent in the amount of $2,925.50 to bear interest at the legal rate 
of 7.38% per annum until paid plus after accruing costs of collection. 
DATED this jJz day of / ^ £ , , 199^ 
BY THE COURT 
Approval As to Form: 
STEPHEN HENRIOD 
District Court Judge C* 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Order of Modification, this s? day of /skft , 1999, to: 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
136 S. Main #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656 
S12\bolligcr.ord 
A~1 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
Kearns Building, Suite 300 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656 
(801) 266-2009; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1860 
Third District Clerk: 238-7460; In-Court Clerk: 238-7021/7022 (Amy/Paula) W47 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, | 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION OF UNDISPUTED 
FACTS 
Civil No. 854903252DA 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
| Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The parties have agreed to stipulate to the following facts for the purpose of judicial 
economy: 
1. The Petitioner is a resident of Arizona; the Respondent is a temporary resident 
of Nevada. 
2. The Petitioner will be 63 years of age on September 5, 1998; the Respondent 
became 63 years of age on January 23, 1998. 
A*f 
3. The Petitioner and Respondent were married approximately 34 years prior to 
their divorce; they have three adult children of issue from their marriage, all of whom live 
in the Phoenix area where the Petitioner resides. 
4. The Petitioner has remained unmarried since her divorce from the Respondent; 
the Respondent remarried in April 1989 and remains married to the same person. 
5. The Petitioner has two basic sources of income: (a) Social Security Benefits in 
the amount of $521 per month and (b) alimony from the Respondent in the approximate 
amount of $1,869 per month, for a total of $2,390 per month. The alimony amount of 
$1,869 is derived from two sources: half of the Respondent's Air Force Retirement in the 
amount of $1,184 per month and a set amount of $685 per month, both set by a decree of 
divorce entered on March 3, 1987. 
6. In addition, the Petitioner claims that the premium for the Air Force Survivor's 
Benefit Plan, in an amount that is approximately $160 per month, should be paid by the 
Respondent without any deduction for such amount from the monthly alimony payment 
of $685. The Respondent believes the decree provides that such premium, which varies 
from time to time, is included in and a part of the $685 alimony payment. 
7. The Respondent has three basic sources of income: (a) Social Security Benefits 
in the amount of $1,071; (b) half of his Air Force Retirement in the amount of $1,184 per 
month; and (c) pension payments from L3 Communications in the amount of $682 per 
month, for a total of $2,937 per month, prior to making payments to the Petitioner in the 
- 2 -
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amount of $685 per month. After paying the Petitioner, the Respondent is left with only 
$2,252 per month, or, $138 per month less than the Petitioner. 
8. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered by this Court, the Respondent 
was earning approximately $5,700 per month from his Air Force Retirement and from 
employment at Sperry (formerly Sperry Rand, later acquired by Lockheed Martin, and 
later changed to L3 Communications). The Respondent's income today has decreased by 
$2,763 per month, or by 48%. 
9. The Respondent's Adjusted Gross Income ("AGI") in 1996 was $90,040; his 
AGI in 1997 was $58,286 (a transition year to retirement); and his expected AGI for 
1998 is $28,764 based on current income. The Respondent's income today has decreased 
by 68% from 1996 and by 50% from 1997. 
10. The Respondent was employed full-time from 1984 to March 1997 until he had 
to accept retirement through a reduction in force from L3 Communications. After his 
retirement from the Air Force and during his employment at L3 Communications, the 
Respondent qualified for and has earned a pension from L3 Communications in the 
amount of $682 per month. 
11. The Petitioner ceased employment in or about June 1991, and has not been 
gainfully employed since that time. 
- 3 -
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AGREED: 
PETITIONER FRANCES R. BOLLIGER 
^7t^~£ 
By: Suzanne Mareiius (#2081), her Attorney /o/t/?y )ate 
RESPONDENT RONALD E. BOLLIGER 
h. /TfrQj-
By: Michael A. Jerisen/(#7230), his Attorney 
/& /ifrr 
Date 
#-/z 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 854903252DA 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Commissioner Thomas N. Amett 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, 
Petitioner, 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Respondent. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Respondent Ronald E. Bolliger in the above 
action, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the foregoing STIPULATION 
OF UNDISPUTED FACTS by personally depositing a copy thereof with the United 
States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to: 
Suzanne Marelius (#2081) 
Littlefield & Peterson 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 531-0435; FAX: 575-7834 
DATED this 14th day of September 1998. 
MICHAEL A. JENS£NyEsq. 
136 South Main StreNe<Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656 
(801) 266-2009; Fax: 519-9264 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
MAR 3 1987 
?r Giefk 3rd Dist COUM 
Ooourv C'erk 
H Dixon riipcpy C c 
By _ V / ^ K < P rCf^S.s— 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No- D85-3252 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
ooOoo 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Court on Wednesday, December 10, 1986, at the hour of 11:30 a.m., 
before Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler, who, by 
stipulation of the parties, presided over the default divorce 
hearing in this matter. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
through counsel, Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant was present in 
person and through counsel, Phillip Story, Jr. The Stipulation 
and Agreement of the parties was read into the record and 
approved in open Court by both parties and their counsel. The 
Court having approved the same, having sworn the Plaintiff and 
heard her testimony, the default of Defendant was noted pursuant 
to Stipulation and the Court having heretofore made and entered 
i r <; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully 
.idvisod in tho premises, • 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to 
become final as of March 3 , 1987. 
2. The parties have entered into a Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement which was read into the Court record 
December 10, 1986, and approved by both parties and their counsel 
in open Court. The Court finds that this Settlement Agreement is 
in full compliance with the law and shall be incorporated herein. 
3. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff for each 
of the months of January, February and March, 1987, the amount of 
$785.00 and the amount of $685.00 as of April, 1987, and 
thereafter, as monthly alimony and one-half of the military pen-
sion retirement benefits authorized under PL97-252, 10 USCS 1408 
et seq. (Former Spouse1s Protection Act). The Defendant is 
ordered to pay to Plaintiff one-half of any increases he receives 
in his retirement benefits and to pass along such increases at 
the time his benefits are increased. The parties agree that the 
support payments outlined in this paragraph shall be payable by 
Defendant to Plaintiff one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 
20th of each month. The parties further agree that Defendant's 
premium, presently $157.00 per month which he shall pay to main-
tain the Air Force Survivor's Benefit Plan is part of his total 
support payment to Plaintiff. The support payments outlined 
herein shall be payable to Plaintiff so long as she lives with 
the exception that they will cease upon Plaintiff1s remarriage, 
cohabitation, or death. 
4. The Defendant shall keep Plaintiff as the sole 
beneficiary under his Armed Forces Survivor Benefit Plan. 
Plaintiff shall thus be treated as the Defendant's spouse for all 
purposes under the Plan. As the surviving spouse, Plaintiff 
shall be entitled to any pre-retirement survivor annuity; and 
Plaintiff's consent shall be required for any election of bene-
fits by the Defendant, other than the qualified pre-retirement 
and retirement joint and survivor annuity as provided under 
Section 417 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
5. The Defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and 
medical insurance in full force and effect for the benefit of 
Plaintiff as it was held at the time of the filing of this 
divorce action on August 30, 1985. This coverage consists of 
Plaintiff's entitlement to CHAMPUS benefits and full medical 
coverage with Defendant's employer, Sperry Corporation. The 
Defendant shall maintain Plaintiff's full medical insurance 
coverage as indicated to the extent allowable under applicable 
law, however, Defendant's premium contribution is not to exceed 
his premium contribution at the time of filing the divorce, 
August 30, 1985. Defendant shall pay all premiums or assessments 
due for Plaintiff's coverage during her lifetime and so long as 
the coverage referred to herein is available to Defendant, sub-
ject to the foregoing limitation. 
6. Defendant is ordered to maintain in full force and 
effect, for the benefit of Plaintiff as sole beneficiary, the 
life insurance policies listed as follows: the $50,000.00 policy 
issued by Unisys Corporation; a $36,000.00 policy issued by 
Veteran's Group Life Insurance until- December 31, 1988 and the 
policy issued by the Air Force Association. Defendant shall pay 
all premiums, assessments or charges incurred for maintaining or 
converting these policies to make Plaintiff the sole beneficiary 
thereon. 
7. Both of the parties shall be awarded the personal 
property presently in their possession as has been previously 
divided by them. In addition, Plaintiff is awarded the 1984 
Pontiac, including the debt thereon; and Defendant shall be 
awarded the 1985 Toyota pickup and 1986 Dodge with the debts 
thereon. Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff's car payment for 
the month of December, 1986, and thereafter Plaintiff shall be 
responsible for the entirety of the debt remaining on the 1984 
Pontiac. 
8. The parties shall each be responsible to assume and 
discharge their separate debts incurred subsequent to the date of 
their separation. The Defendant is ordered to pay any balance 
presently due to Plaintiff's attorney, Suzanne Marelius, 
including any further reasonable legal fees and costs incurred 
relating to this proceeding, up until the date of entry. 
4 
DATED t h i s O day of '1f^\(XAy^M 
^L , 1987 . 
BY THE COURT: 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge ^UD ^}£W£zv 
RECOMMENDATION OF COMMISSIONER 3y /PU^U^-
Sandra N. Peuler, Commissioner, having heard the above 
matter, herewith recommends that the foregoing Order be entered 
in this matter. 
DATED this day of , 1987, 
Deputy Co 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
Commissioner 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
>HILLIP C. STORY, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS COUNfYOFSALTlAKE ) 
I, THE UNOCaSlGMEO. CLERK CF THE OISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, 0 0 HGf<EBY 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED ANO f ORCGO^CG 13 
A TRUE AND FULL COP/ OF AN ORIGSUVL DOCU-
MENT ON FILE IN MY OFFiCE AS SUCH CLERK. 
WITNESS MY HANO AND SEAL OF SAID COURT 
THIS -J3- DAY OF - V ? ? ^ ^ 19 - 2 ^ Z 
H. DIXON HINOLEY. CLERK 
BY ^ ^Z^U/^c-^ <^> OtPUTY 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V. ) 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, ) 
) Civil No. D85-3252 
Defendant. ) (Judge David B. Dee) 
ooOoo 
The above matter having come before the Court on 
Wednesday, December 10, 1986, at the hour of 11:30 a.m., before 
Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler, who, by 
stipulation of the parties, proceeded to hear the default divorce 
hearing in this matter. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant was 
present in person and represented by counsel, Phillip Story, Jr. 
The joint Stipulation of the parties was read into the record and 
having been approved by both parties and both counsel on the 
record, was received and approved by the Court. The Court also 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and based on the 
testimony presented by Plaintiff, and now being well advised in 
the premises, the Court does enter its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1., The parties herein are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and were such for three months immediately 
preceding the filing of this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been 
married June 4, 1953, in Elko County, State of Nevada, 
3. There have been three children born as issue of 
this marriage, none of which is a dependent or under 18 years of 
age. 
A. During the marriage, Plaintiff was treated cruelly 
by Defendant causing her great mental distress and anguish to the 
point where a continuation of the marital relationship was 
impossible and Plaintiff filed an action for divorce against 
Defendant. 
5. There has been no real property acquired by the 
parties during the term of the marriage. In addition, the par-
ties have acquired household furnishings, appliances, a 1984 
Pontiac, a 1985 Toyota truck, and a 1986 Dodge. 
6. During the term of the marriage, the parties 
incurred certain joint debts and obligations including obliga-
tions to Sears, Mastercharge, Visa, Granite Furniture, 
Castletons, Mervyns, and loans for the automobiles. 
7. Each of the parties are able-bodied and employed. 
The Defendant is employed at Sperry Corporation and earns a gross 
annual income of approximately $45,600.00 per year. Defendant 
4-20 
was a member of the Air Force for twenty-eight years and receives 
an Air Force pension of approximately $1,428.00 per month. 
Plaintiff is employed part-time at The Cookery and earns $4.00 
per hour, a gross monthly income of approximately $340.00. 
8. Plaintiff is presently covered by Defendant's medi-
cal insurance with his employer, Sperry Corporation, and is also 
entitled to CHAMPUS medical insurance benefits. 
9. Plaintiff is a beneficiary on certain life 
insurance policies on Defendants life as follows: the Air Force 
Association Policy; $36,000.00, Veteran's Group Life Insurance; 
$50,000.00 Unisys Corporation Policy, and the Air Force 
Survivor's Benefit Plan, for which Defendant pays a $157.00 
monthly premium. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court 
does enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1« The Court does have jurisdiction to hear this 
matter, and upon hearing, does conclude that the Plaintiff should 
be awarded a Decree of Divorce against Defendant, the same to 
become final on March 1, 1987. 
2. The parties have entered into a Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement which was read into the Court record 
December 10, 1986, and approved by both parties and their counsel 
in open Court. The Court finds that this Settlement Agreement is 
in full compliance with the law and should be incorporated in its 
entirety in the Court's Decree as set forth below. 
4-2/ 
3. The Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff for each 
of the months of January, February and March, 1987, the amount of 
$785.00 and the amount of $685.00 as of April, 1987, and 
thereafter, as monthly alimony and one-half of the military pen-
sion retirement benefits authorized under PL97-252, 10 USCS 1408 
et seq. (Former Spouse's Protection Act). The Defendant further 
agrees to pay to Plaintiff one-half of any increases he receives 
in his retirement benefits and to pass along such increases at 
the time his benefits are increased. The parties agree that the 
support payments outlined in this paragraph will be payable by 
Defendant to Plaintiff one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 
20th of each month. The parties further agree that Defendant's 
premium of $157.00 per month which he agrees to pay for the 
Survivor's Benefit Plan is part of his total support payment to 
Plaintiff. The support payments outlined herein shall be payable 
to Plaintiff so long as she lives with the exception that they 
will cease upon Plaintiff's remarriage, cohabitation, or death. 
4. The Defendant agrees to keep Plaintiff as the sole 
beneficiary under his Armed Forces Survivor Benefit Plan. 
Plaintiff will thus be treated as the Defendant's spouse for all 
purposes under the Plan. As the surviving spouse, Plaintiff will 
be entitled to any pre-retirement survivor annuity; and 
Plaintiff's consent will be required for any election of benefits 
by the Defendant, other than the qualified pre-retirement and 
retirement joint and survivor annuity as provided under Section 
417 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
5. The Defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and 
medical insurance in full force and effect for the benefit of 
Plaintiff as it was held at the time of the filing of this 
divorce action on August 30, 1985. This coverage consists of 
Plaintiff's entitlement to CHAMPUS benefits and full medical 
coverage with Defendant's employer, Sperry Corporation. The par-
ties agree that Defendant will maintain Plaintiff's full medical 
insurance coverage as indicated to the extent allowable under 
applicable law, however, Defendant's premium contribution is not 
to exceed his premium contribution at the time of the divorce 
filing, August 30, 1985. Defendant agrees to pay all premiums or 
assessments due for Plaintiff's coverage during her lifetime and 
so long as the coverage referred to herein is available to 
Defendant, subject to the foregoing limitation. 
€• Defendant should be ordered to maintain in full 
force and effect, for the benefit of Plaintiff as sole benefi-
ciary, the life insurance policies listed as follows: the 
$50,000.00 policy issued by Unisys Corporation; a $36,000.00 
policy issued by Veteran's Group Life Insurance until December 
31, 1988; and the policy issued by the Air Force Association. 
Defendant agrees to pay all premiums, assessments or charges 
incurred for maintaining or converting these policies to make 
Plaintiff the sole beneficiary thereon. 
7. Both of the parties should be awarded the personal 
property presently in their possession as has been previously 
divided by them. In addition, Plaintiff should be awarded the 
1984 Pontiac, including the debt thereon; and Defendant should be 
awarded the 1985 Toyota pickup and 1986 Dodge with the debts 
thereon. Defendant agrees to pay Plaintiff's car payment for the 
month of December/ 1986, and thereafter Plaintiff will be respon-
sible for the entirety of the debt remaining on the 1984 Pontiac. 
8. The parties have previously apportioned their joint 
marital obligations and represent to the Court that these will be 
fully paid by the end of Decemberf 1986. The parties should be 
responsible to assume and discharge their separate debts incurred 
subsequent to the date of the separation. The Defendant should 
be ordered to pay any balance presently due to Plaintiff's 
attorney, Suzanne Mareliusr including any further reasonable 
legal fees and costs incurred relating to this proceeding, up 
until the date of entry. 
DATED this 3 day of M as^cJ^ , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
V i 2 ^ ^ ^ - <n 
Dft¥*D B. DEE— 
District Court Judge fxy^c £*^ t^ f>« 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Facsimile: (801) 575-7834 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES R. BOLLIGER, 
Petitioner, 
-ooOoo 
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCES BOLLIGER 
vs. 
RONALD E. BOLLIGER, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 854903252 DA 
Judge Henriod 
-ooOoo-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
FRANCES BOLLIGER, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states as follows: 
1, I am die Petitioner in die above-matter and make this Affidavit of my own 
personal knowledge and belief. 
2J I was married to Ronald Bolliger for 34 years and we raised three children 
together. When we divorced in 1987 I was working part-time as a waitress and he was 
employed full-time at Sperry Corporation. A review of the Court documents at that time show 
4 
I was earning $4,800 per year and he was earning $46,500. The Decree awarded me half his 
Airforce retirement $714 per month, alimony $685 per month for total annual income of 
$21,588. At that time Mr. Bolliger's total earned and military retirement income less alimony 
was $46,000. 
3. Mr. Bolliger's last full year of employment was 1996 where his total adjusted 
gross income was $90,040. In 1996 my total income was about $17,664 from alimony and 
military retirement. 
41 In approximately 1991 I ceased my part-time employment as a waitress because 
of health problems. At that time I was earning about $500 a month from waitress work. Over 
the years I have had increasing problems with arthritis in my hands and legs which have 
impacted my ability to work in my usual employment as a waitress. I have been treated with 
steroids and other medications for this chronic arthritis pain without success. I developed ulcers 
in 1990 and had a ruptured ulcer and surgery that year. I have been prescribed Zantac since that 
time and a special diet which has increased my food cost. I suffered a stroke April 9, 1998 
which has affected my left side. I was diagnosed with Bells Palsy in 1992 and continue to suffer 
from that disorder. I have very high blood pressure and take medication for that condition. I 
am scheduled for surgery this month to remove a bone fungus from my face. 
5\. My doctor has advised for the past several years that I am not to do any 
significant physical activity and that I not be employed. Considering my level of energy and 
medical needs I know that I am unable to maintain any reasonable level of employment. I was 
2 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
FRANCES BOLLIGER, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says that 
she has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and knows and understands the contents thereof and 
the same is true as to her own knowledge except to those matters herein stated upon 
information and belief as to those matters, she believes the same to be true. 
DATED this _IA day of (Mji* , 1998. 
1998. 
FRANCES BOLLIGER v 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £$ day of £frto~BglZL , 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at "7%b£WK
 r /J7. 
My Commission Expires: 
DENIES R FREY 
g) Nc\ar> Pubi.: - Stale o< Anicna 
M W C O P A COUNTY 
»A COT* So-os Sep! 25.2001 
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%*vu>d %. 9kx>tfc 2.0V Kst^JC frneS&SPcMatoty20. 
&idhtf.&0>42.0. &»JHs6An>JZ2. 
September 29, 1998 
Re: Frances Bolliger 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Please allow me to introduce myself as Ms. Bolliger's 
neurologist. She was first seen in the hospital on 4/9/98 
feeling "not herself". At the same time she was reporting 
symptoms affecting her left arm and leg in the setting of a 
head CT scan documented right lacunar subcortical infarct. 
This was all consistent with a right thalamic stroke in the 
setting of very high blood pressure. 
She continues to be seen in the office for the symptoms that 
brought her initially into the hospital. We are awaiting an 
MRI of the brain and carotid duplex ultrasound with focus on 
the vertebrobasilar system. 
It is my opinion, given her neurologic deficits alluded to 
above, Ms. Bolliger is not fully neurologically intact nor 
would I advise her to work. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. 
Thanking you for your consideration. I am, 
< ^ I V U ^ % ^ Aqurs truly, 
Cary, M.D, 
GCC/be 
&&WU& • 4£44Mrtt SSttsfvtAue •&&**&, S&voo*a S50S5 • £6S-*4M 
&fo*ux • *#S4*jK>rt&*%Ast*eAU6, #40S •&&€*&, S&%*>** M0*7 • 7S04SSS 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters 
in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other 
party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
